

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Analysis of Representative John V. Lindsay's article in the March 1964 Issue of ESQUIRE Magazine

1. Lindsay's article in Esquire is basically an edited version of his floor speech of 15 August 1963. There are no new substantive points, although some material on South Viet Nam has been added. He has softened the tone of the piece, however, by the use of the third person in some cases, the omission of quotations from Ransom and Szulc and Meyer, and the omission of any mention of Chinats in Burma, the Korean invasion, and other incidents.

2. In general, the article pleads the case for a joint committee of Congress to oversee the intelligence community; Lindsay's four basic arguments are directed toward the four suggested areas of responsibility of the joint committee. He proceeds by asserting that "special operations" conducted by the CIA, whether they succeed or fail, need to be controlled. They are integral parts of our foreign policy which are often not supervised or coordinated. He also questions the "dominant role" of the CIA in the intelligence community, particularly in the making of national estimates, because CIA is in a position to "carry its special institutional tendencies into the shaping of American foreign policy." The problems raised by "unchecked power" in the intelligence community, he concludes, can only be solved by the creation of a joint committee of Congress. This joint committee should examine the problems of CIA/State relationships, intelligence and operations, selection and training of personnel, and intelligence evaluation. (These and other points are examined at greater length in the Appendix.)

3. Lindsay's presentation has the appearance of an objective and reasoned philosophical inquiry into the place of intelligence in a free society, now and in the future. He divorces himself from the role of an expert, employing the technique of using the third person to say: "The criticism most frequently heard is. . ."; "The charge had been made that. . ."; "It has been alleged. . ."; or "The CIA appears to have. . . ." He speaks of both "actual and potential power" and a threat which is a "marginal one at the outset, but potentially a most serious one." Lindsay talks about what has happened and is happening and what will happen or might happen in the same breath. He avoids strong statements, and mixes blame with praise. The net effect of this caution and this mixture, however, is to damn the CIA and identify it, along with the "intelligence community," as a major danger to "free political systems and individual liberties."

4. In his analysis Lindsay ignores the question of supervision and direction by the executive branch. He comes close to implying that policy guidance will come from Congress, and that Congress will resolve conflicts among agencies. He ignores entirely the role of the President, the NSC, and the Special Group in supervision of the intelligence community. He also ignores the question of how effective Congress could be in alleviating the problems he sees.

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***APPENDIX I**

Detailed Examination of Lindsay's Argumentation and Presentation

1. Lindsay begins his article by stating that two major foreign policy reversals in three years (the Bay of Pigs and policy in South Viet Nam) resulted from "the three principal instruments of U. S. foreign policy" (State, military, and CIA) being in conflict at crucial times. Having identified CIA as an instrument of policy, he charges that the CIA was "meddling in policy, undertaking functions not its proper responsibility," and using intelligence to justify unsound policy. He implies, however, that lack of policy direction was responsible for conflicts among State, the military, and CIA, and for CIA's role in "shaping" policy. Although he praises CIA for Iran and Guatemala, he concludes that every operation, whether it succeeds or fails, shows the "explosive nature of CIA's operational involvement in international politics." Lindsay has thus indicted CIA for shaping policy, while implying that the fault lies with lack of policy on a higher level.

2. CIA has great actual and potential power, he states, which is now checked only the skill of the men who run CIA. This power is necessarily secret power, but "necessary" secrecy can breed "unnecessary" secrecy and CIA will become first a marginal threat to democratic institutions, then "potentially a most dangerous one."

3. He charges that CIA is "making" or "shaping" foreign policy despite attempts to remove the making of foreign policy from CIA. As long as both

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State and CIA collect intelligence, and CIA conducts special operations, the problem of "integrating" CIA into the general foreign-policy apparatus will continue to grow in scope and potential danger.

4. Lindsay also raises some questions about agency personnel at various levels. He does this by pointing to areas of concern, while praising the personnel involved. Thus, he states, although the top officials of CIA are skillful and able and dedicated, only the DCI is a political appointee and thus politically responsible. He also suggests that retired military officers and "political refugees" employed by the agency should be investigated to determine their impact on CIA. They are, however, described as men of great ability and dedication, without whom the agency could not function effectively. He is unaware that only 126 CIA employees are retired military personnel, both officer and enlisted, of whom more than a hundred retired on disability. There are also 880 military personnel, enlisted and officer, detailed to the agency at the present time.

5. Lindsay concludes his attack on CIA by questioning the organization of the intelligence community. He sees the CIA in not merely a central but a dominant position, a position from which it could "carry its special institutional tendencies into the shaping of American foreign policy." The fact that CIA collects much of the intelligence, that the Board of National Estimates is part of CIA, and that the DCI both chairs USIB and goes to the NSC contribute to CIA's preeminence. CIA also is both a member of the intelligence community and the chief coordinator.

6. Only Congress can alleviate the "difficulties of unchecked power in the intelligence community." A committee should be established to inquire into

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foreign intelligence and information programs, including State/CIA relation, especially abroad, the relationship of intelligence and operations, the selection and training of personnel, and the question of intelligence evaluation.

7. He rejects the counter arguments that secrecy would be endangered, by citing Congressional monitoring of atomic energy, weapons development, and foreign policy. He asserts also that the intelligence community is not responsible merely to the President, but that Congress has a right and duty to oversee it. He also rejects the argument that Congressional surveillance is already adequate, stating that the present system fails because foreign affairs committees are not involved, present surveillance is cursory and sporadic, and jurisdiction cannot be clearly defined.

8. Such a joint committee, he concludes, would both protect the public interest and defend the CIA against unwarranted attacks. When secret processes are "shaping some part of foreign policy," free political systems and individual liberties can be swiftly undermined.

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